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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RODNEY G.
SHERAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Criminal Law-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-On application to reduce the degree or class of an offense, the trial
judge may review the weight of the evidence, but an appellate
court should consider only its sufficiency as a matter of law.
(Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 6.)
Id.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-In passing on a
motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, it
is the exclusive province of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses, determine the probative force of testimony,
and weigh the evidence.
3b] Id.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-In considering the sufficiency of evidence on a motion for new trial, the
court may draw inferences opposed to those drawn at the trial,
and where the only conflicts consist of inferences deduced from
uncontradicted probative facts, the court may resolve such conflicts in determining whether the case should be retried.
[4] !d.-Appeal-Review of Findings on Motion for New Trial.A reviewing court will reverse the trial court's determination
on a motion for new trial for insufficiency of the evidence only
where it can be said as a matter of law that there is no
substantial evidence to support a contrary judgment.
[5] ld.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-While it is the
exclusive province of the jury to find the facts, it is the duty
of the trial court to see that this function is intelligently and
justly performed, and in the exercise of its supervisory power
over the verdict the court, on motion for new trial, should
consider the probative force of the evidence and satisfy itself
that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Id.-Verdict-Modiflcation.-The power given by Pen. Code,
§ 1181, subd. 6, to the trial court to modify a verdict or
judgment without granting a new trial is to be exercised as
that court typically functions, and since the court is given
both the power to grant a new trial and to reduce the degree
or class of crime in the same section, the court's exercise of
the power is the same in both cases.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 663 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1446; [2, 3, 5) Criminal Law, § 948 ; [ 4] Criminal Law, § 1339 ; [ 6] Criminal Law, § 934 ;
[7] Homicide, § 272; [8] Homicide, § 148; [9] Homicide, § 23;
[10] Criminal Law, § 952; [11] Criminal Law, §§ 970(5), 970(6).
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[7] Homicide-Appeal-Disposition.-Unless a reviewing court can
say as a matter of law that there was no evidence or inference
therefrom contrary to those drawn by the jury in returning
a verdict of second degree murder, the trial court's determination that defendant was guilty of no crime greater than
manslaughter, and its order reducing the crime to that class,
should be affirmed.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Manslaughter.-The trial court's conclusion in
an uxoricide case that defendant was guilty of no crime greater
than manslaughter was sustained by evidence that he lived
in great fear of being returned to a state hospital where he had
once been incarcerated at his wife's instigation, and that he
told the arresting officer that he and his wife had driven into
the hills (where her body was found) and that an argument
had ensued after which everything went "blooey," since it was
reasonable to infer that the couple quarreled and that defendant, having lost all ability to reason, struck her the fatal blows
in the heat of passion. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 1.)
[9] Id.-Manslaughter-Provocation.-The provocation which will
stir in the heart of the slayer that heat of passion which reduces a homicide from murder to manslaughter must be such
as would have a like effect on the mind and emotions of
the average man-the man of ordinary self-control.
[10] Criminal Law-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.-To
entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must appear that the evidence is not merely
cumulative, but is material, that it is such as to render a
different result probable on retrial, and that the party could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at
the trial.
[11] Id.-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.-.A motion for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence based
on sodium pentothal examinations, as a result of which defendant thought he could recall some of his movements on the day
of the murder charged, was properly denied where it could
not be said as a matter of law that a different result would
have been probable on a new trial, and where no reason was
given as to defendant's failure to submit to such examinations
prior to or during the course of the trial.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County and from orders reducing the class of crime charged
and denying a new trial. Carlos Raymond Freitas, Judge.
Affirmed.
[9) See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 130; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 22.
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second
degree murder, reduced to manslaughter, affirmed.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, Victor Griffith, Deputy Attorney
General, William 0. Weissich, District Attorney (Marin), and
Roger Garety, Assistant District Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Bagshaw, Schaal, Martinelli & Talley, Bagshaw, Schaal &
Martinelli and Thomas E. Schaal for Defendant and Appellant.
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Rodney G. Sheran, was found
guilty by a jury of the second degree murder of his wife,
Esme. 1 Defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence was denied by the trial court which,
however, granted defendant's motion to modify the verdict
by reducing the crime from second degree murder to manslaughter. The People appeal from the order reducing the
class of the crime; defendant appeals from the order denying
his motion for a new trial. 2
The body of a deceased woman was found at approximately
10 :30 on the morning of May 26, 1955, lying on a fire road
in the hills of Marin County about four miles from Fairfax.
The record shows that the body was identified later that day
as Esme Sheran, the wife of the defendant; that her death
had been caused by crushing blows to the head which, in the
opinion of the autopsy surgeon, could have been caused by
several large blood-stained rocks found near the body. It
was the opinion of the autopsy surgeon that the death had
occurred between 6 p. m. and midnight of May 25, 1955.
There was no alcohol in the blood of the deceased woman ;
there was no evidence of any sexual attack or of any struggle
having taken place ; the clothing was clean and untorn ; the
body was free of bruises and the fingernails were long and
unbroken. A pair of broken colored glasses was found near
the body of the deceased.
A search of the Sheran apartment at Greenbrae, Marin
'Defendant pleaded not guilty and later was permitted to plead not
guilty by reason of insanity. The latter plea was, however, withdrawn.
1
The notice of appeal declares that defendant also appeals from the
judgment but this, apparently, bas been abandoned since the briefs
are concerned only with the order denying his motion for a new trial.
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on May 26th, revealed a note in the defendant's
handwriting which read: "Dear Esme: I have decided to leave
for a few days, so don't feel hurt if I'm not here when you
return. I will mail you a check, and also one for the rent,
so don't worry. All my love, Rod." A woman's handbag
eontaining the decedent's driver's lieense and other articles
and keys was also found in the
Mrs. Potter, a neighbor of the Sherans, testified that she had
seen them both in the
of their apartment on tlw
afternoon of May 25th; that she had seen Mrs. Sheran for
the last time shortly before 5 p. m., and the defendant some
20 minutes earlier. She testified that earlier in the afternoon
the defendant had asked her if she would like to earn 50 cents
an hour digging his grave. Another neighbor testified that
she had seen the defendant sitting in his red pickup truck
across from the apartment about 4 :30 on the afternoon of May
25th and that she had seen the decedent a few minutes earlier.
James Oliver testified that the defendant, with whom he had
been acquainted for several years, had entered his store at
Pt. Reyes Station in Marin County at about 7 p. m. on the
night of May 25th and that he had at that time purchased a
bottle of sweet vermouth and a bottle of Burgundy wine
and that he had then driven off in the direction of Olema and
San Rafael. Captain Volk of the Larkspur police department
testified that he had seen the defendant in his truck in the
Greenbrae area at approximately 11 :30 p. m. on May 25th;
that he had not recognized the defendant's truck and had
stopped him; that defendant conversed with him and that
he appeared perfectly normal; that he had known the defendant for some time. All of the witnesses testified that defendant seemed perfectly normal when they had seen him
and that he was not under the influence of alcohol.
The defendant was picked up in his pickup truck in
Oregon about 180 miles north and east of the California
border on May 28, 1955. When the officer who arrested him
told him that he was wanted in California and that he
"imagined" the defendant knew "what for," the defendant
replied "I think so," or "I imagine so." The officers testified that on May 28th in the county jail in Vale, Oregon,
the defendant, in response to questions, stated that he last remembered seeing his wife Esme in their apartment when she
gave him a package of cigarettes; that they got into the red
pickup truck and went to a store in San Anselmo where he
waited while she went inside; that they then drove to the hills
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started and that
When defendant was
testified that his clothing
unshaven and appeared
officers testified
that desca.rrf'd " "bruised" and "lacerside of the seat in the
were
a hand-axe as well as
suitcase; on the floor was a partially
can of beans which had been
with something
; a paper bag with some food
which had left a
articles was also found in the truck cab. Several rocks
were also found in the cab of the truck. The canvas top
covering the bed of the truck was missing 3 and the cardboard liner from the inside of the cab was in the back part
of the truck.
All tests made on defendant's clothing, person and the
truck were negative.
At the trial defendant testified that after his wife got out
of the truck in San Anselmo he remembered nothing; that
he did not recall driving to Pt. Reyes and making his purchases from Mr. Oliver; that he did not remember being
stopped by Captain Volk in Greenbrae. He testified that
he did not remember driving into the hills; that he did not
recall hitting his wife with either his fists or with rocks; that
he did not remember writing the note to his wife; that he
did not tell the Oregon officers that he and his wife had an
argument and that after that everything had gone '' blooey. ''
Concerning the condition of his knuckles he testified that
he told the officers it could have occurred while he was opening
a can of food, or at his work of bulldozing. Defendant testified that his first recollection after stopping at the store in
San Anselmo was waking up in "a valley" and later being on
a highway outside of Boise, Idaho.
The record shows that defendant had, some two or three
years prior to the time of his arrest, been committed to
Napa State Hospital at the instigation of his wife. He testified that when he was arrested in Oregon he thought it was
probably because his wife had put out a wanted call for
him and that she had "sworn out a warrant to probably return me to Napa." His testimony was to the effect that his
3
The witnesses who had last seen him telltiiied that the canvas eover
was on the truck on May 25th.
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head had felt "fuzzy" while he was waiting for his wife outside the San Anselmo store; that he thought maybe she had
given him a cigarette containing marijuana. He testified
that after waking up outside of Boise, Idaho, the next thing
be remembered was the officer who stopped him where he
was parked off the highway in Oregon fixing a headlight on
his truck; that he was driving the truck in the same direction as the officer had gone when the officer, who had turned
and was coming back, motioned him to stop and told him he
was under arrest. Defendant testified that while he was in
the Oregon police officer's car he heard two broadcasts on the
radio which informed the police that he had been apprehended and that he was wanted for murder in California.
He testified that after the first broadcast he thought he might
have hit somebody or run over them with his car; that after
the second broadcast he remarked to the officer that ''I hope
they know what they're talking about because I certainly
don't.'' Defendant's testimony concerning the manner of
his arrest and his statements was corroborated by the arresting officers.
The medical testimony on behalf of the People was to the
effect that if defendant suffered from amnesia it was probably
of the hysterical type brought on by some great emotional
shock, traumatic experience or fear; that such an amnesia
would be of the retrograde type which would extend back to
some period preceding the shock, traumatic experience or fear
which caused it. In the expert's opinion it was ''just as
likely" that defendant was malingering as it was that he
was suffering from retrograde amnesia.
The evidence heretofore set forth is substantially all of the
evidence and is entirely circumstantial. The testimony taken
before the grand jury is part of the record and contains evidence given by defendant's mother wherein she stated that
defendant was in great fear of being returned to Napa and
that he had said that he would rather be dead than go back
there. The only evidence directly, or indirectly, linking defendant with the crime is that he was seen leaving the Greenbrae area with his wife in the truck, and his statement to
the Oregon officer that he drove her into the hills where an
argument started and that thereafter everything went
"blooey."
The People contend that a trial court does not have the
power under section 1181, subdivision 6, of the Penal Code
to weigh the evidence in order to modify a verdict or judg-

meu.t.
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Section 1181, subdivision 6, provides: "When a verdict has
been rendered against the defendant, the court may, upon his
application, grant a new trial, in the following cases only:
. . . 6. When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence, but
if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the
degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty
of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify the judgment accordingly without
granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend
to any court to which the cause may be appealed; . . . "
The People rely on People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876,
884, 885 [256 P.2d 911], People v. Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 493
[261 P.2d 241), and People v. Jones, 136 Cal.App.2d 175,
194 [288 P.2d 544], for the proposition that the trial court
may not weigh the evidence in order to modify the judgment
but is held to the same rule applicable to appellate courts:
that if there is substantial evidence in support of the judgment the court may not interfere with the verdict of the jury.
In the Daugherty case we were concerned with the rule applicable to appellate courts and we specifically stated that
"The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence
to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. It is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt."
Even though the following language in the Sutic case is
susceptible of the construction placed on it by the People,
the opinion, when read in its entirety shows that this court
was considering the duty and power of an appellate court.
It was there said: "As above discussed. the evidence fully
justified the jury's finding that the homicide was the result
of defendant's intent to kill and was accomplished by his
'lying in wait' until the opportune time to strike, or that the
homicide was a 'willful, deliberate, and premeditated' act,
without finding as to 'lying in wait.' In either event it was
murder in the first degree. . . . Under such circumstances
neither the trial court nor this court would be authorized
to reduce the degree of the crime. (People v. Daugherty,
40 Cal.2d 876, 884-886 [256 P.2d 911].)" This statement was
in answer to defendant's contention that the degree of the
crime should be reduced on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to indicate that he had the requisite intent to
justify a verdict of first degree murder. His motion for a
reduction had been denied by the trial court. This court
was there pointing out that the evidence was sufficient to
support the determination of the trial court in denying de-

power.

[1] The correct rule is that stated in People v. Thomas,
25 Cal.2d
905
P.2d 7], where we were construing the effect of section 1181, subdivision 6 of the Penal
Code. In the Thomas case we had before us the question of
the power of an appellate court to weigh the evidence in reducing the degree or class of a crime. We said: "While the
power granted to the appellate court is equal to that given
the trial court the circumstances which will justify its exercise
in a particular court are those which are appropriate to
typical functioning of that court. In other words, upon an
application to reduce the
or class of an offense, a trial
judge may review the we'ight of the evidence but an appellate
court should consider only its sufficiency as a matter of law.
This is in accord with the general rule stated in People v.
Holt (1944), supra,
pages 59, 70 [25 Cal.2d 59 (153
P.2d 21)]: 'The function of the
was to appraise the
weight of the evidence; ours is to appraise its legal adequacy'
and (p. 90) 'While the
is
the function of determining the facts upon the evidence it does not have the power
of changing the standard
to what constitutes murder of
the first
degree].'
in People v. Howard
(1930), supra, 211 Cal.
P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 13851,
are disapproved.
examined the record in this case we
do not feel constrained to hold that the evidence is legally inadequate to
a verdict of murder of the first degree.

on the
t

In conthe court may draw ""t""''n
trial
, and
consist of inthe
ferences deduced from
court may resolve such conflicts in
case should be retried
can be said as a matter of law that there is no substantial
evidence to support a contrary
that an appellate
court will reverse the order of the trial court." (Brooks
v. Metropolitan
Ins.
27 Cal.2d 305, 307 [163 P.2d
689]; Richardson v.
, 44 CaL2d
775
P.2d 269].)
[5] In People v.
41 CaL2d 628, 633 f262 P.2d 14],
this court said that " 1,Vhile it is the exclusive province of the
jury to find the facts, it is the duty of the trial court to see
that this function is intelligently and justly performed, and
in the exercise of its
power over the verdict, the
court, on motion for a new
should consider the probative
force of the evidence and satisfy itself that the evidence as
a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict.''
[6] The power given by the statute (Pen. Code, § 1181,
subd. 6) to the trial court is to be exercised as that court
typically functions (People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 904,
905 [ 156 P .2d 7 J) . The section in effect provides that in lieu
of granting a new trial, the trial court may reduce the degree or class of the crime if the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of a lesser degree or of a lesser crime. Inasmuch as the trial court is given both the power to grant a
new trial or reduce the degree or class of the crime in the
same section, it would appear that the trial court's exercise
of the power is the same in both cases.
The second question which presents itself is whether there
is evidence in the record, or inferences to be drawn from that
evidence, to support the trial court's determination that the
defendant was guilty of no
crime than manslaughter.
[7] Unless we can say as a matter of law that there is no
evidence in the record, and that no inference can be drawn
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from the evidence contrary to those drawn by the jury, we
must affirm its order reducing the class of the crime.
The People argue that malice may be implied from the
manner in which the death occurred (People v. Modock, 46
Cal.2d 141 [292 P.2d 897] ; People v. Powell, 34 Cal.2d 196
[208 P.2d 974]) and that the burden was thereafter on the defendant to prove circumstances in mitigation to lessen the
degree or class of the crime.
In the case at bar the trial judge stated that he was of
the opinion that the evidence did not establish malice beyond
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. In other words,
he did not believe that ''the evidence as a whole (was) sufficient to sustain the verdict" (People v. Robarge, 41 Cal.2d
628, 633 [262 P.2d 14] ). [8] The record shows that defendant
lived in great fear of being returned to Napa State Hospital
where he had been incarcerated at one time at his wife's instigation; it also shows that he told the Oregon officer that he
and his wife had driven into the hills and that an argument
had ensued after which everything went "blooey." From
this the inference is reasonable that the couple quarreled
and that defendant, having lost all ability to reason, struck
her the fatal blows in the heat of passion. (Pen. Code, § 192,
subd. 1.) The trial judge, in judging the credibility to be given
the witnesses, and the weight to be accorded the evidence, as
well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom, concluded that
he could not ''conceive of Mr. Sheran-unless this event happened in a sudden, provoked fit of anger-having killed his
wife in open view to the public." [9] The inferences drawn
by him from the evidence-that Esme Sheran played upon
defendant's great fear of being returned to Napa and thereby provoked a sudden quarrel in which the defendant killed
her in the heat of passion-bring the case within the rule
affirmed by this court in People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121,
140 [169 P.2d 1], that "The provocation which will stir in
the heart of the slayer that heat of passion which reduces the
homicide from murder to manslaughter must be such as would
have a like effect upon the mind and emotions of the average
man-the man of ordinary self-control." (People v. Golsh,
63 Cal.App. 609, 614 [219 P. 456] .) We cannot say, as a
matter of law, that the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom, do not support the trial court's conclusion
that defendant was guilty of no greater crime than manslaughter. [3b] Where the only conflict consists of inferences deduced from uncontradicted probative facts, the trial
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court may, on a motion for a new trial, resolve such conflicts
and draw inferences opposed to those drawn by the jury at
the trial. (Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sunset etc. Co., 176 Cal.
451, 456 [168 P. 1033]; Cauhape v. Security Savings Bank,
118 Cal. 82, 84 [50 P. 310].)
Defendant appeals from the order denying his motion for
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. It
appears that after the trial defendant subjected himself to
two sodium pentothal examinations. As a result of these
examinations and some dreams defendant thought he could recall some of his movements on May 25th. A careful scrutiny
of the results of the examinations shows that defendant's
recollection could have been of occurrences at any time prior
to the day in question. He sought to establish that he had
driven many miles around Marin County on a trip which
would have taken some four or more hours and would have
made it impossible for him to have committed the crime as
early as six or seven in the evening. He recalled having
crawled through a new fence with a bottle in each hand;
that the fence was near a small oak tree. The bottles were
later found at the point where he recalled having placed
them, but the evidence was far from conclusive that his
recollection was of the day of the crime.
[10] To entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence it must appear that the evidence is
not merely cumulative, but is material, and that it is such
as to render a different result probable on retrial; and that
the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced it at the trial. (People v. llicGarry, 42 Cal.2d
429 [267 P.2d 254]; People v. Miller, 37 Cal.2d 801 [236 P.2d
137).) [11] We cannot say, as a matter of law, that a different result would have been probable on a new trial. The
evidence did not fill the many gaps left open by defendant's
failure to remember the occurrences of May 25th. Furthermore, no reason was given as to defendant's failure to submit
to the sodium pentothal examinations prior to, or during the
course of, the trial. The motion was properly denied.
The order modifying the verdict by reducing the class of
the offense from second dc>gr('e murder to manslaughter is
affirmed. The order denying defendant's motion for a new
trial is affirmed, from which it must necessarily follow that
the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J ., concurred.

